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Вооружённые силы Джибути — совокупность войск республики Джибути, предназначенная для защиты свободы, независимости и территориальной целостности государства.


The Republic of Djibouti is located on the northern coast of the Horn of Africa, on the southern side of the entrance from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea. It has an area of 22, 000 km^, almost all of which is desert. Most economic activities of consequence revolve around the port city of Djibouti, which contains two-thirds of the population and is the seaward terminus of the only railway line linking the interior of Ethiopia with the sea. The non-urban population almost all live from their herds of goats and sheep, and lead a semi-nomadic existence. The city and the country of Djibouti owe their existence to this strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea and to their economic role as Ethiopia's main outlet to the sea. The country was created within its present boundaries by France in the late nineteenth century, to serve as a strategic French base in the area. The first French treaty with a local chieftain was signed in 1862, and by 1885 the whole of Djibouti's present territory was included within the protectorate's borders. It was an entirely artificial creation, as it straddled the boundary between the Somali-related peoples to the east, represented mainly by the Issa tribe, and the Afars (an Ethiopian nationahty) to the west. There was an endemic hostility between these two ethnic groups, as Somali tribes had gradually been pushing westwards along the coast, driving the Afars before them, for centuries. As a further complicating factor, both ethnic groups were part of far larger national entities beyond Djibouti's borders. The Issas regard themselves as part of the Somali people who occupy the Horn. The Afars of Djibouti belong to the Afar or Danakil group extending well inland and far up the Eritrean coast, which has traditionally struggled to maintain a wide degree of autonomy from the Ethiopian imperial centre in the highlands, and at the same time tends to regard itself as Ethiopian vis-a-vis the Somalis. The only significant unifying factors are that both the Issas and the Afars are Muslim and heavily Arabised, as a result of the influence of the Arabian peninsula across the Red Sea and of successive waves of Yemeni Arab immigrants over the centuries. The Issas are the dominant ethnic group in Djibouti, having 50% of the entire population and about 80% of that in the capital, while the Afars, with around 40% of the total, predominate in the western three-quarters of the country. There also exists a 6% Arab minority, who control much of the wealth in the country and dominate trade and the skilled labour market in Djibouti town but have generally eschewed politics. The smaller European minority are almost all temporary residents. The population of Djibouti in 1976 was about 215,000 (of whom 13,000 were Europeans), plus an additional fluctuating population of about 40 ,000 nomads. The great majority of the population is extremely poor, the illiteracy rate is 90% , and the modern sector of the economy revolving around the port, the railway and the government services is so small that the unemployment rate in the capital is 85% . Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the territory existed primarily as a minor French naval base, taking on some added importance and prosperity after the railway line to Addis Ababa was completed in 1917. It was proclaimed an overseas territory (TOM) of France under the name French Somali Coast in 1946, and a 20 member Representative Council was established. In 1957 this was replaced by a 32 member elected Territorial Assembly from which was chosen a Council of Ministers to run the local administration in co-operation with the French governor. In the following year the electorate voted two to one in favour of remaining part of the newly invented French Community in the referendum which was held in all French colonies in 1958. In the same year, however, came the first manifestation of internal trouble, when the Issa leader of the Council of Ministers and his colleagues were dismissed for having urged the voters to reject the new constitution that was adopted in the referendum. What had happened was that the growing national consciousness and irredentist sentiment of newly independent SomaUa was beginning to infect the Issa majority in Djibouti. The French response was to reorganise and limit the electoral register so as to ensure a majority of Afar voters. Pro-independence Issas were expelled, and a barbed- wire fence was constructed around the town of Djibouti and guarded by French soldiers to prevent a further influx of nomad Somalis. In this pohcy France had the whole-hearted co-operation of Ethiopia, which was also the subject of Somali territorial claims. (Mogadishu formally claimed all of Djibouti, the eastern fifth of Ethiopia, and much of north-east Kenya, on the grounds that they were inhabited mainly by Somalis.) Ethiopia was particularly concerned to prevent Somalia from gaining control of Djibouti as it would place the Somalis astride Ethiopia's main transport link with the sea. In successive elections and referenda between 1958 and 1974 the link with France was reaffirmed and mainly Afar pohtical parties were kept in power locally, due to the French policy of fixing the electoral register. From 1966 onwards, however, the governments of Ali Aref (the leading Afar political figure) and the representatives of the French colonial administration were the targets of repeated demonstrations, riots and terrorist acts, the latter being carried out principally by the Somali-based Front de Liberation de la Cote des Somalis (FLCS). This was accomplished by a steady rise in tension between Afars and Issas, and numerous violent inter-communal clashes. The number of French troops in the territory was augmented until it reached over 7000 men, but as late as 1975 the French government had no intention of allowing Djibouti its independence.

A number of factors then conspired to cause a complete French about-face within a period of 5 months — between November, 1975 and Aprjl, 1976. One was undoubtedly the rise of a demand for independence amongst the Afars as well. This was triggered by the breakdown of central control in Ethiopia after the revolution there, which allowed an irregular force numbering some 6000 men called the Afar Liberation Front to establish effective control over the Afar-populated areas of Ethiopia adjacent to Djibouti. It seemed for a time that an Afar-led government taking Djibouti into independence would be able to unite with these territories and thus reduce the internal Issa majority to minority status, while also being able to resist pressures from Somalia or Ethiopia. Belatedly responding to this change in Afar nationalist opinion, Ali Aref changed the name of his party from 'Union and Progress within the French Community' to 'National Union for Independence' (UNI), but he moved too slowly. His party split and his support dwindled. Other influences were also pushing the French to a reassessment of their policy in Djibouti. Demands by the anti-colonialist lobby at the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and other international bodies that France grant Djibouti independence, were becoming a serious embarrassment. In the course of 1975 both Ethiopia and Somalia gave assurances that they would respect the independence of a free Djibouti, thus ensuring that whatever arrangements France made for base rights in the country after independence would not be negated by the annexation of the country by one of its large neighbours. Above all, France's erstwhile collaborator in the region, Ethiopia, was turning increasingly to the Soviet Union for assistance, while Somalia in reaction to this was drifting towards closer ties with the West. Accordingly, an anti-Somali, anti-independence policy in Djibouti had become a liability, and France abruptly dropped it. In December, 1975 France announced that the territory would be granted full independence, and then immediately shifted its support from the Afar parties to the main Issa party, the Ligue Populaire Africaine pour I'lndependance (LPAI) , led by Hasan Gouled. Leading LPAI members were released from jail or allowed to return from exile, the electoral registers were rectified and the number of qualified voters more than doubled within months, and an independence referendum was organised for May 8th, 1977. In the month before the referendum the main Afar parties, which had abstained from the pre-independence negotiations in Paris, announced their unconditional support for independence, and the referendum was carried by a 98% vote. The country became independent on June 27 th, 1977 with Hasan Gouled as President, and a cabinet led by Prime Minister Ahmad Dini, a leading Afar politician, which contained a balanced mixture of Issas and Afars. As the French had eventually realised, most leading Issa politicians in Djibouti were not in practice anxious to exchange their status of national leaders for that of provincial officials in an outlying province of Somalia, and the question of union with the latter was not raised. Within weeks of independence Djiboutijoined the UN, the OAU and the Arab League. In a gesture intended to foster unity in the country by appealing to the two main groups' shared religious and cultural ties to the Arabian peninsula, Arabic was declared the country's official language. Moreover, as Paris had anticipated, the new government proved entirely willing to sign a military agreement with France which left it all its naval facilities and indeed retained almost the entire French garrison in the country. The military agreement between France and Djibouti, signed on independence day, provided that over 4000 French troops should remain in the country, gradually withdrawing to a camp near Djibouti— Ambouli airport and handing over patrol and internal security duties to the new Djibouti army. They would be available for the defence of Djibouti against any foreign aggression, but would not assist in the maintenance or re-establishment of internal order. France would provide logistical support and technical assistance in the creation of Djibouti's armed forces, and provide them with appropriate training in French military schools or within the country. French forces stationed in the country in accordance with this agreement include two motorised regiments, the 5th Overseas Mixed Forces Regiment equipped with AMX-13 light tanks and ATGWs, a regiment of artillery, 12 Mirage III fighters and a helicopter detachment, and four patrol boats. Moreover, Djibouti port remains available for the support of the French navy's Indian Ocean squadron, which is now the largest Western naval force in that ocean, usually including one aircraft carrier and about a dozen other surface combatants . The force's principal base is at the French island of Reunion , but Djibouti is of great strategic importance as the only remaining Western naval base in the sensitive north-western part of the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Djibouti faces what is becoming the Soviet Union's principal naval base in the region, Aden, across only 150 miles of the Gulf of Aden. The Djibouti government's motives in making this agreement with the French are both economic and military. Local expenditure in support of the French military presence constitutes a substantial, perhaps irreplaceable, part of the exiguous national income. It was already evident at independence, moreover, that war was brewing between Ethiopia and Somalia, and that the main campaign would be fought near Djibouti's borders. The war duly came only a month later, and was fought out, with considerable participation by Cuban troops as well as Ethiopians and Somalis, during the remainder of 1977 and early 1978. Thanks partly to the deterrent of the French mihtary presence, however, Djibouti remained untouched by it despite the country's vital strategic importance as the terminus of Ethiopia's only railway to the sea. The internal compromise between the Afars and Issas in the government did not have a smooth course, however. In December, 1977 all but two of the seven Afar ministers in the government resigned protesting against the tribal politics they claimed were being pursued by the Issa President, Hasan Gouled. Another Afar, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Muhammad Kamil, was appointed Prime Minister in place of Ahmad Dini, and was given the portfolio of Defence Minister as well, but there were bomb explosions in Djibouti and accusations that Afars in senior civil and miUtary posts were being systematically removed from office. France, without publicity, sent in another thousand troops. In subsequent months four of the five Afar ministers who had resigned rejoined the government and the tension eased somewhat, but the main issues remained: the Afar demand that the constitution be revised to give the Afar Prime Minister greater real powers to balance those of the Issa President, and the question of ethnic parity in the armed forces. At independence Djibouti had regular and auxiliary military forces numbering 3000, of which 500 were gendarmes, 900 were 'Territorial Guards' and 500 were in the 'Autonomous Nomad Group' used for desert patrols. They were trained, armed and organised on the French model. The intention is to double the regular forces to about 2000 men (about 1% of the population), but there has been a discernible preference for recruiting Issas into this force. Many Issas who were formerly members of the guerrilla organisation PLCS have been taken into the army, but the government is resisting an Afar demand that the 6000 men of the Afar Liberation Front who have been fighting in Ethiopia against the central government (many of them originally from Djibouti) be brought to Djibouti and enlisted in the army. The government has declared that it would only be prepared to assimilate between 700 and 1000 Afar fighters into the army. At the time of writing the dispute had not been settled, and neither the final size nor the internal communal balance of the Djibouti army were known for certain. Djibouti's government has been coming under considerable pressure from victorious Ethiopia since February, 1978 to redress the ethnic balance in the army and government which, it is alleged, increasingly favours the Issas. So long as large numbers of French troops are stationed there, however, it is unlikely that this pressure will have decisive effect. The strategic location of Djibouti and its considerable military facilities make it a most desirable base for any power with an interest in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. So long as France retains an interest in the Indian Ocean, however, it is likely that Djibouti (with judicious Saudi prodding if necessary) will continue to grant the French navy port facilities. Likewise, so long as the French army is in Djibouti, there is little likelihood that the internal situation will get out of hand. Any question of union with Somalia has been dropped, at least for the moment, after that country's military disaster in February, 1978, while the French presence also helps to stave off Ethiopian meddling in Djibouti's internal politics.



1200px-Emblem of the South African Department of Military Veterans.svg Вооружённые силы Африки Sa-army
Северная Африка:АлжирЕгипетЛивияМароккоТунис
Центральная Африка:АнголаГабонКамерунДР КонгоКонго (Браззавиль)Сан-Томе и ПринсипиЦАРЧадЭкваториальная Гвинея
Западная Африка:БенинБуркина-ФасоГамбияГанаГвинеяГвинея-БисауКабо-ВердеКот-д’ИвуарЛиберияМавританияМалиНигерНигерияСенегалСьерра-ЛеонеТого
Восточная Африка:БурундиДжибутиЗамбииЗимбабвеКенияРуандаСомалиТанзанияУгандаЭритреяЭфипияЮжный Судан
Южная Африка:БотсванаКоморыЛесотоМаврикийМадагаскарМалавиМозамбикНамибияСвазилендЮАР
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